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Stability, Autonomy, and the Foundations of Political Liberalism*
Anthony Taylor, University of Oxford 
Principles of political morality satisfy what I will call the stability condition if citizens 
of a society that was effectively ordered by them would come to comply with them 
freely in ideal conditions.1 The question of whether principles of political morality 
must satisfy this condition has significant and far-reaching implications for theory 
development in political philosophy. If our principles must satisfy the stability 
condition, then those principles that would not be complied with in these ideal 
conditions—due to, say, motivational incapacities—ought to be rejected. To accept the 
condition is therefore to give claims about human nature a central place in political 
philosophy.2
The question of whether principles must satisfy the stability condition is also 
significant because an affirmative answer to it shaped much of the work of John 
Rawls. In A Theory of Justice, he aimed to show that his principles would satisfy the 
stability condition by arguing that the desire to act justly and the desire to live a good 
life would be congruent from the point of view of each citizen.3 And later Rawls’s 
commitment to the stability condition quite clearly guided the development of his 
view in Political Liberalism. Famously, it was his dissatisfaction with the original 
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ancestors, I thank David Birks, Dan Butt, Ian Carroll, John Halstead, Sam Kiss, Matt Kramer, Henrik 
Kugelberg, Cécile Laborde, Dan McDermott, David Miller, Tom Parr, Jon Quong, Tom Sinclair, Zofia 
Stemplowska, Collis Tahzib, Katy Wells, Andrew Williams, and Caleb Yong. I also owe special thanks 
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1 What is needed to satisfy this condition will be elaborated in detail below.
2 For a rejection of the view that claims about human nature should play this role, see David Estlund, 
“Human Nature and the Limits (If Any) of Political Philosophy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 (2011): 
207–237. 
3 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
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2
congruence argument for stability that lead him to make his view sensitive to the fact 
that any liberal society will be marked by reasonable pluralism.4 Given this shaping 
influence that the stability condition had on Rawls’s thought, it is difficult to take an 
overall position on his view, and especially on his now much discussed accounts of 
liberal legitimacy and public reason, without taking a position on the defensibility of 
the stability condition.  
Given the significance of the question of whether principles of political morality must 
satisfy the stability condition, it is surprisingly difficult to find much by way of 
sustained argument in defense of it in the literature.5 This would unsurprising if it 
were simply obvious that the soundness of our principles depended on them 
satisfying this condition, but this is not the case. Though the stability condition is 
consonant with a recent trend in political philosophy pressing for theories to be more 
realistic, the condition itself is neither obvious nor widely accepted. G.A. Cohen held 
that while stability is a condition of wise social choice, treating it as a constraint on 
principles of political morality would be absurd, for it would render the question of 
whether a just society would persist over time a conceptually confused one.6 And 
Joseph Raz argued that while stability has some value, it is “not the be-all and end-all 
of the theory of justice”.7 More loosely, but perhaps more tellingly, few political 
philosophers writing today aim to show that the principles they favor could satisfy 
the stability condition, presumably because they do not think that this is necessary to 
establishing the soundness of those principles. 
The aim of this paper is to offer a novel a defense of the stability condition. I begin by 
examining the suggestion that principles that are stable in this way are necessary for 
4 Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005): xv–xvi. 
5 A noteworthy exception here is Larry Krasnoff, “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity in Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism,” The Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 269–292. 
6 Rescuing Justice and Equality, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008): 327–328.  
7 “Facing Diversity: The Case of Epistemic Abstinence,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 19 (1990): 16. 
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the realization of a valuable form of autonomy: the political value of full autonomy.8
To enjoy this kind of autonomy, citizens must freely endorse the social and political 
institutions that have played a significant role, via their upbringing, in shaping their 
character and self-conception. The stability condition is satisfied when citizens give 
their free and reflective endorsement to the principles that support the social and 
political institutions they have grown up under. When this is the case, citizens are 
autonomous in the sense that they do not experience their sense of justice as an alien 
imposition.9
Examining this thought, I will argue, first, that though the connection between 
stability and full autonomy is suggestive, it is incapable of delivering a compelling 
defense of the stability condition. A compelling defense of the stability condition 
needs to explain why the principles of political morality that would be stable in this 
way are the principles that we have most reason to accept. An autonomy-based 
defense of the stability condition could, therefore, only succeed if the principles that 
allow for the realization of full autonomy are not in conflict with the principles we 
have most reason to accept. This is, in essence, the claim that two aims we might 
attribute to political philosophy are in harmony: the aim of identifying the conditions 
under which we can live autonomously, and the aim of identifying the principles that 
8 Rawls, Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 77. For an early but unelaborated account of the connection 
between autonomy and stability see Joshua Cohen’s “A More Democratic Liberalism,” University of 
Michigan Law Review 92 (1994): 1516–1517, where he states that autonomy provides a reason for holding 
that stable social cooperation is a basic good. Matthew Clayton sets out the relationship between stable 
principles and autonomy in more detail in his Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing, (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006): 11–19. Further, autonomy is also given a central place by Paul Weithman in his 
various discussions of political liberalism and the stability condition, though as we will see below his 
concern is ultimately somewhat different to my own. See his Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s 
Political Turn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); “Citizenship, Reflective Endorsement and 
Political Autonomy,” The Modern Schoolman 78 (2001): 135–50; “Convergence and Political Autonomy,” 
Public Affairs Quarterly 25 (2011): 327–48; “Stability and the Original Position from Theory to Political 
Liberalism,” in The Original Position, edited by Timothy Hinton, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015): 237–238; “Autonomy and Disagreement about Justice in Political Liberalism,” Ethics 128 
(2017): 95–122; and “In Defense of a Political Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 45 (2017): 397–412. 
9 I will elaborate on this idea in much more detail in §III below. For ease of exposition, I refer to this 
value as ‘full autonomy’, though I always mean autonomy understood as a distinctly political value. 
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we have most reason to accept. Though the truth of this harmony claim is far from 
obvious, I offer a defense of it in the latter part of the paper. Overall, this amounts to 
a provisional case for holding that the principles that satisfy the stability condition 
are, in fact, the principles we have most reason to accept. 
I think that this defense of the stability condition has an important role to play in the 
debate surrounding Rawls’s political liberalism. Proponents of political liberalism 
often appeal to the stability condition at crucial junctures in their defenses of the 
view.10 But the extent to which this appeal is persuasive is dependent on the 
defensibility of the condition. If the stability condition can be defended in the manner 
I suggest here, then this may be a significant victory for defenders of political 
liberalism. But the argument is also of wider importance. For if the case I offer for the 
stability condition is sound, then even if proponents of political liberalism are wrong 
to claim that their principles satisfy the condition, the question of what principles do
satisfy it is an incredibly significant one.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section I gives a sketch of political liberalism, 
paying particular attention to how the view is motivated by the aim satisfying the 
stability condition. Section II then sets out in detail what satisfying the condition 
requires, and introduces the central challenge that I aim to address: why must 
principles of political morality be stable in this way? Section III explores the 
relationship between full autonomy and stability. In section IV, I present my defense 
of the stability condition that builds on this relationship. Section V concludes.  
10 Burton Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” in The Cambridge Companion to Rawls, edited by 
Samuel Freeman, (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2003): 316–45; Samuel Freeman, Justice 
and the Social Contract: Essays on Rawlsian Political Philosophy, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2007): 175–213; Jonathan Quong, Liberalism Without Perfection, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 
2011): 158–160; Paul Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, supra note 8.  
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I. 
The best way to introduce the stability condition is through a brief discussion of its 
role in Rawls’s thought. One of Rawls’s aims in Theory was to show that his conception 
of justice, justice as fairness, would enjoy a special kind of stability.11 In order to satisfy 
this stability condition, he first needed to show that the citizens of a society that was 
well-ordered according to justice as fairness would acquire a sense of justice informed 
by its principles. This he aimed to do by offering an account of how the desire to act 
justly would be acquired in accordance with three psychological principles.12 Having 
shown that citizens would acquire the desire to be just in this way, he needed to show 
further that they would give this desire sufficient weight in their practical reasoning 
that it would not be consistently trumped by their other desires. This he aimed to do 
by arguing that the desire to be just would be a part of each citizen’s good. In the 
conditions of a well-ordered society, the desire to act justly (the right) and the desire 
to live a good life (the good) would be congruent from the point of view of each 
citizen.13 If this argument had succeeded, it would have shown that justice as fairness 
satisfies the stability condition: citizens who lived under it would not simply comply 
with its principles due to the threat of punishment, they would freely affirm those 
principles and comply with them because doing so is part of their good.  
The next step in this story is that the argument Rawls made for the congruence of the 
right and good is incompatible with the fact of reasonable pluralism: the fact that “a 
plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result 
of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a 
constitutional democratic regime”.14 Given that justice as fairness is a liberal 
democratic conception of justice, this incompatibility is fatal. The argument for 
11 A task taken up in part III of that book.  
12 Theory, supra note 3 at 397–449.  
13 Ibid. 450–514. For discussion, see Samuel Freeman’s “Congruence and the Good of Justice,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Rawls, supra note 10 at 277–315. 
14 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at xvi. 
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stability had supposed that citizens of a society well-ordered by justice as fairness 
shared a partially comprehensive doctrine, and that this provided a key component 
of their basis for seeing their sense of justice as a part of their good. This partially 
comprehensive doctrine was, broadly speaking, Kantian. Every member of the well-
ordered society was supposed to share a desire to express their nature as a free and 
equal rational being. And to express your nature as a free and equal rational being is, 
Rawls states “to act on the principles that would be chosen if this nature were the 
decisive determining element”.15 Since the choice from the original position is 
designed such that our nature as free and equal rational beings is the decisive 
determining element of the choice of the principles of justice, the fact that the citizens 
of the well-ordered society share this desire to express their nature plays a key role in 
securing the stability of justice as fairness in the argument of Theory.16 In short, since 
this desire is a desire to act on the principles that would be chosen in the original 
position, it thereby amounts to a desire to act on the principles of justice as fairness.17
In coming to think that the well-ordered society would inevitably be inhabited by 
members adhering to a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, Rawls came 
to doubt that they would all share the desire to express their nature in this way. And 
to doubt this is to doubt that Rawls’s argument for the congruence of the right and the 
good succeeds. The goal of showing that justice as fairness satisfies the stability 
condition will not have been achieved after all.  
It is at this point that political liberalism enters the picture. The central aim of political 
liberalism is to show that a well-ordered society that contains a plurality of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines could nonetheless satisfy the stability condition.18 To realize 
this possibility the conception of justice that orders such a society must, Rawls argues, 
15 Theory, supra note 3 at 222.  
16 For the part of Rawls’s congruence argument that depends on this desire, see Ibid., §86, especially 
501–503. 
17 Weithman, Why Political Liberalism?, supra note 8 at 118.  
18 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at xviii.  
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be a political one. Distinct from comprehensive doctrines—which include beliefs and 
ideals that pertain to all of life—political conceptions of justice are concerned with a 
more limited range of questions: those concerning constitutional essentials and 
matters of basic justice.19 These are, roughly, questions about what rights and liberties 
should be included in a written constitution, and questions about what principles 
should regulate major social institutions.20 A conception of justice that is cast as 
political rather than comprehensive can avoid conflicting with the plurality of 
comprehensive doctrines that would be held in a well-ordered liberal society, making 
it possible for proponents of those comprehensive doctrines to endorse it from their 
varied perspectives.21 Given the fact that the well-ordered society will necessarily 
contain a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, the stability condition can 
no longer be satisfied by showing that all of the citizens of that society will have a 
shared desire to express their nature as free and equal rational beings. Rawls argues 
instead that stability can be secured by showing that principles of justice could be the 
subject of an overlapping consensus. Such a consensus holds when citizens adhering 
to different comprehensive doctrines can, despite their other disagreements, agree on 
a political conception of justice for evaluating the major institutions of their society. A 
distinctly political conception of justice facilitates this form of consensus, as it is acts 
as a “module […] that fits into and can be supported by [the] various reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines that endure in the society regulated by it”.22
19 Ibid. xlviii. 
20 Ibid. 11–12.  
21 Ibid. 482–483. 
22 Ibid. 12. 
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Since a political conception is not presented as, or derived from, any particular 
comprehensive doctrine, it “must contain its own intrinsic normative and moral 
ideal”. For political liberalism, this is the criterion of reciprocity: 
Citizens are reasonable when, viewing one another as free and equal in a 
system of social cooperation over generations, they are prepared to offer one 
another fair terms of social cooperation […] and they agree to act on those 
terms, even at the cost of their own interests in particular situations, provided 
that others also accept those terms. For these terms to be fair terms, citizens 
offering them must reasonably think that those citizens to whom such terms 
are offered might also reasonably accept them […] not as dominated or 
manipulated, or under the pressure of an inferior political or social position.23
This moral ideal gives rise to the two most discussed features of political liberalism: 
the liberal principle of legitimacy and the duty of civility. The liberal principle of 
legitimacy states that the exercise of political power is legitimate only when it is 
“exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free 
and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse”.24 The duty of civility, which falls 
on individuals, is a moral duty to “be able to explain to one another on those 
fundamental questions how the principles and polices they advocate and vote for can 
be supported by the political values of public reason”.25
A justification for the exercise of political power can only satisfy the criterion of 
reciprocity, political liberalism holds, if it is drawn from a political conception of 
justice that is also liberal. Liberal conceptions have three features: they specify “certain 
rights, liberties, and opportunities (of a kind familiar from democratic regimes)”; they 
give “a special priority” to these liberties over demands to further the general good; 
and they assure all citizens adequate all-purpose means to make use of their liberties 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 137. 
25 Ibid. 217. 
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and opportunities.26 There are thus numerous liberal conceptions of justice, of which 
justice as fairness is one.  
It is these features—its status as political rather than comprehensive and its intrinsic 
moral ideal—that distinguish political liberalism from rival liberal views and rival 
conceptions of political morality in general. And they are, of course, controversial. 
They rule out appeals to conceptions of the good life and metaphysical doctrines as 
potential justifications for the exercise of political power. They also rule out appeals 
to variants of utilitarianism, which would not give a guaranteed special priority to a 
set of rights and liberties over the requirement to promote utility. And they rule out 
appeals to views, such as Robert Nozick’s libertarianism, which would not guarantee 
all citizens sufficient resources to make use of their liberties.27
Why should we accept these restrictions? What reasons do we have to restrict the 
scope of our conception of justice to political questions, and to eschew appeals to 
comprehensive doctrines as justifications for the exercise of political power? An 
answer to this question that is accepted in some form by Rawls and a number of his 
defenders is this: only a political liberal conception of justice can satisfy the stability 
condition.28 Given the fact of reasonable pluralism, no conception of justice based on 
a comprehensive doctrine could enjoy the special kind of stability that a political 
liberal conception can, which Rawls calls “stability for the right reasons”.29
26 Ibid. 6. 
27 Anarchy, State, and Utopia, (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1974).  
28 Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” supra note 10; Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, 
supra note 10 at 175–213; Quong, Liberalism without Perfection, supra note 10 at 158–159; and Weithman, 
Why Political Liberalism?, supra note 8. I do not mean to imply that they take an appeal to stability to 
provide a complete answer to the question of why we ought to accept political liberalism, only that 
they take it to be a key part of the story.  
29 On this kind of stability, see Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 140–144. I examine Rawls’s stability 
condition in detail in the next section.  
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There are two kinds of concern we might have about this answer. First, we might 
wonder why the aim of showing that principles of justice would satisfy the stability 
condition is such an important one. What is wrong with principles that fail to satisfy 
this condition? In pressing this concern, we need not hold that stability is entirely 
devoid of value—instead, we can simply ask why a failure to realize it counts 
decisively against a conception of justice. Call this challenge stability-skepticism. 
Second, we might question the claim that a political liberal conception of justice, and 
only a political liberal one, can enjoy this kind of stability. That is, even if we accept 
the fact of reasonable pluralism, we may wonder whether the contours of this idea fall 
where political liberalism takes them to: perhaps the principles that actually satisfy 
the stability condition are quite different from those Rawls defends. Call this challenge 
content-skepticism.  
Since the distinction between these two challenges to the argument from stability to 
political liberalism is central to this paper, let me expand on it further. We can see the 
distinction most clearly in two contrasting responses to the following question: is it 
true that a conception of political morality that is distinctly political and liberal, in the 
way just described, would come to be the subject of an overlapping consensus in the 
well-ordered society? The content-skeptic thinks that Rawls and his followers have 
offered insufficient grounds for answering this question in the affirmative. Why not 
hold that a different set of principles would be the subject of this consensus? Or, 
indeed, that there are no principles that would be? The stability-skeptic, by contrast, 
has a different attitude. Even if we accept that there would be an overlapping 
consensus on these principles, they ask why this fact matters. Why does this fact speak 
in favor of political liberal principles? In short, they ask why we should accept the 
stability condition. 
In this paper I will only be concerned with stability-skepticism, and I will set content-
skepticism aside. Though the question of whether content-skepticism can also be 
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answered is vital for a full defense of the argument from stability to political 
liberalism, the question raised by stability-skepticism is foundational. There is little 
point in investigating whether political liberal principles satisfy the stability condition 
if we end up rejecting the condition entirely.  
II.  
In the next section I will consider a response to stability-skepticism that goes via an 
appeal to a conception of autonomy. Before I can set out this argument, however, I 
need to say more than I have done so far about the stability condition. In order to see 
how an appeal to autonomy might answer stability-skepticism, we first need to see 
more precisely what such stability consists in.  
The first component of the stability condition that requires further elucidation is the 
idea of a well-ordered society. A well-ordered society is one whose institutions are 
effectively regulated by a conception of justice and are recognized as just by the 
citizens that populate it. Every citizen of a well-ordered society accepts the conception 
of justice that effectively regulates their society and knows that each of her co-citizens 
also accepts it. A well-ordered society also satisfies a full publicity condition: the 
entirety of the case for the conception of justice that orders that society—the beliefs 
and modes of reasoning that support it—are known by every citizen.30 The idea of a 
well-ordered society is thus “plainly a very considerable idealization”.31
As I noted above, establishing that a society well-ordered by particular principles 
would satisfy the stability condition is a two-step process. The first step is to establish 
that the citizens of that society would acquire the desire to act justly—a sense of 
justice—as part of their upbringing. Rawls takes himself to establish this by providing 
30 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 66–71. 
31 Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 2001): 9. 
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a psychological account of the process by which such a desire would be acquired.32
The second step is to show that the citizens of this well-ordered society would give 
their sense of justice sufficient weight in their reasoning, such that it would not 
consistently lose out to their other desires when they are deciding how to act. This 
second step is necessary because showing that the citizens of a well-ordered society 
would acquire a sense of justice does not suffice to show that they will be disposed to 
act justly in the long run. If they find that their sense of justice is often in conflict with 
the pursuit of their other interests, then they may come to resent the desire to act justly 
and take steps to rid themselves of it.33 If this were the case, then the stability 
established by the first step would, over time, be undone by citizens’ reflective attitude 
toward their desire to act justly.  
The second step is therefore to show that citizens of the well-ordered society would 
not have this attitude toward their sense of justice. In order to achieve this, it takes 
them to be considering the question of what place to give their sense of justice in their 
life from a particular point of view: a point of view from which they are bracketing 
their desire to be just for its own sake and considering only their other desires.34 From 
this perspective, they are to ask themselves whether they have sufficient reasons to 
preserve and encourage their sense of justice.  
This second step therefore requires a theory of justice to, in Rawls’s words, “supply 
other descriptions of what the sense of justice is a desire for” and use these to show 
that a person bracketing their desire to be just for its own sake would still “confirm 
this sentiment as regulative of his plan of life”.35 The reason the question must be 
considered from this particular bracketed perspective is that, given the first step has 
32 Theory, supra note 3 at 397–434. 
33 Ibid. 295, 451. 
34 Ibid. 499. 
35 Ibid.
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been completed, these citizens have already acquired an effective sense of justice. If 
they were to consider the question of what place to give their sense of justice in their 
life while examining all of their desires, it would be trivially true that they would 
choose to affirm it.36 Given that they have an effective sense of justice, they want to act 
justly. Therefore, examining all of their desires would lead them to conclude that they 
ought to preserve and maintain this desire. Their situation is in this way analogous to 
that of a participant in a loving relationship who desires above all else to act for the 
benefit of their loved one. Suppose we were to ask such a person whether they ought 
to take steps to rid themselves of this desire. Considered in one way, this question 
would trivially be answered ‘no’—it is what they desire, after all. But they could also 
reflect on it considering only their other desires. From this perspective, they might 
find that this desire is quite bad for them, even ruinous. And if they did find this, then 
there would be a sense in which it is rational for them to take steps to rid themselves 
of it: in spite of the pull that it has over them, it is detrimental to their good. Citizens 
of the well-ordered society are in an analogous situation. Though they want to act 
justly, when they reflect on their desire from this bracketed perspective they may find 
that it is detrimental to their good. However, if the stability condition’s second step is 
satisfied, they will find that, in fact, they have sufficient reasons to preserve and 
encourage their sense of justice. When this second step is satisfied, then, they have an 
effective sense of justice that they reflectively endorse: they want to act justly above all 
else—they can see no good reasons to attempt to rid themselves of this desire.  
Beyond the satisfaction of these two steps, the stability condition has one final and 
important feature. For all I have said so far, the desires needed to complete the second 
step could come about solely in response to the threat of punishment. The citizens of 
the well-ordered society could desire to act justly above all else due to the presence of 
an effective coercive power that threatens to punish them severely for acts of injustice. 
36 As Rawls notes: Ibid. 498. 
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However, principles for which the second step was satisfied in this way would not 
satisfy the stability condition. In order for the condition to be satisfied the 
aforementioned desires must come about freely. This means that the desires that 
stabilize the conception must be come about solely via the educative effects of growing 
up in a society well-ordered according to its principles.37 If other forces such as the 
threat of punishment are required in order to bring about these desires, then the 
principles do not satisfy the stability condition.38 In this sense, when principles satisfy 
the stability condition they are ones that citizens of a well-ordered society want to 
follow on the basis of the free exercise of their practical reason alone.39 I will label this 
feature of stability the freedom condition, as it will be a focus of my discussion in section 
IV. 
We can therefore summarize the stability condition as follows: principles of political 
morality satisfy the stability condition when the citizens of a society well-ordered by 
these principles would freely and unanimously give them their reflective 
endorsement.  
III.  
Now that I have set out in detail what it takes to satisfy the stability condition, it 
should be clear that it stands in need of defense. After all, it is not self-evident that 
principles that fail to satisfy this condition ought to be rejected. An alternative 
37 Theory, supra note 3 at 401. Weithman provides an illuminating account of this distinction between 
free and forced stability, Why Political Liberalism?, supra note 8 at 43–51.  
38 Rawls does, however, think that any well-ordered society will need a penal system to solve its mutual 
assurance problem. Such a problem occurs because, he supposes, the desire to act justly is conditional 
on sufficient compliance by others. Therefore, if a citizen lacks confident assurance of her co-citizens 
motives, she may not act justly despite her desire to do so. Here “the existence of effective penal 
machinery serves as men’s security to one another” (Theory, supra note 3 at 211). What is important to 
note here is that the penal system is not required to ensure that citizens have the desire to act justly in 
the first place, it is only required to ensure that citizens who want to act justly in fact do so.  
39 It is this idea of free acceptance that is central to stability for right reasons. See Political Liberalism, 
supra note 4 at 142–143. 
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response one might have to the conclusion that their favored principles would not 
satisfy the stability condition is to hold that the fault lies not with those principles, but 
with the citizens who reject them. Perhaps the principles that we have most reason to 
accept are simply not capable of commanding free and unanimous acceptance in the 
conditions of a well-ordered society.  
The thought that principles of political morality need not be suitable for public 
knowledge and acceptance is not novel. For one, it undergirds Henry Sidgwick’s well-
known endorsement of utilitarianism as an esoteric morality. Sidgwick held that since 
ordinary citizens would be likely to make erroneous utility calculations, they should 
be taught to follow a simpler set of moral rules than the principle of utility. On his 
view, utilitarianism itself ought to be kept comparatively secret, with knowledge of it 
confined to an “enlightened few”.40 Utilitarianism is unsuitable for public acceptance 
on Sidgwick’s view, but this fact is not taken to be damning of it—it is only damning 
of ordinary citizens’ ability understand and consistently act on the principle of utility. 
Plato’s view in the Republic is similarly that the truth about political morality is 
unsuitable for public knowledge and acceptance. Ordinary citizens could not be 
persuaded that philosophers ought to rule because they are philosophers. Plato thus 
recommends the use of myths that aim to persuade ordinary citizens to accept the rule 
of philosophers. As Larry Krasnoff writes of Plato’s view, since ordinary citizens 
“cannot be brought to believe that members of the highest-class ought to rule because 
they are philosophers, they must be brought to believe that it is the gold in their veins 
that entitles [them] to rule.”41 I do not mention these two views in order to endorse 
them, but rather to make clear that stability-skepticism cannot be dismissed without 
argument. The claim that principles of political morality ought to be rejected if they 
40 The Methods of Ethics, (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1981[1907]): 489. 
41 “Consensus, Stability, and Normativity,” The Journal of Philosophy 95 (1998): 269–92.  
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would not satisfy the stability condition is a controversial one that stands in need of 
defense.42
What I will call the argument from full autonomy aims to provide precisely this 
defense. Here is its basic idea: when principles satisfy the stability condition the 
citizens who live under them enjoy a valuable form of autonomy. This form of 
autonomy consists in the fact that the principles that constrain them are not externally 
imposed constraints on their lives but are rather constraints they would choose to 
endorse in conditions of freedom. Principles that are stable are thus ones that, in 
Thomas Nagel’s words, “realize some of the values of voluntary participation, in a 
system of institutions that is unavoidably compulsory”.43
To expand on this basic idea, we must consider the relationship between stability and 
autonomy in more detail. A person is autonomous, so the well-worn analogy goes, 
when they are the author of their own life.44 Though there are numerous conceptions 
of what is required to live autonomously, it is generally agreed that a person fails to 
be autonomous when their life is the product of alien or external forces. A pervasive 
and powerful force that acts upon each of our lives is our upbringing in a particular 
social and political world. Or, to put it another way, the social and political institutions 
that we grow up under exert a significant shaping influence on us.45 If as adults we 
come, after a process of rational reflection, to reject the underlying principles that 
regulate our social and political institutions, then we will thereby be rejecting a central 
force that has operated to make us who we are. If we find ourselves in this situation, 
42 For a more recent rejection of the claim that principles of political morality must be suitable for public 
knowledge and acceptance see Katarzyna De Lazari‐Radek and Peter Singer, “Secrecy in 
Consequentialism: A Defence of Esoteric Morality,” Ratio 23 (2010): 34–58. 
43 Equality and Partiality, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1991): 36. 
44 The source of this metaphor is Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon, 1986):  386. 
45 The idea that social and political institutions play a central role in shaping our motivations and self-
conception is an important theme of Rousseau’s political philosophy. See, for example, the discussion 
in Joshua Cohen’s “Reflections on Rousseau: Autonomy and Democracy,” Philosophy & Public Affairs
15 (1986): 275–297. 
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we can aptly be described as lacking a degree or component of autonomy. What is 
marked out by the stability condition is a situation in which citizens do not find their 
lives to have been shaped by alien forces in this way. When principles of political 
morality are stable, the citizens who grow up under them come to give them their free 
and reflective endorsement. This means that in addition to accepting these principles, 
they accept the influences that their social and political institutions have had on 
them.46 When the stability condition holds, citizens of the well-ordered society thereby 
experience a key aspect of themselves—their sense of justice—as a product of their 
own will rather than of alien forces.47
The autonomy that citizens of a stable well-ordered society enjoy is what Rawls calls 
the political value of full autonomy. Citizens realize this value “in their recognition 
and informed application of the principles of justice in their political life […] as their 
effective sense of justice directs”.48 In explaining the value of full autonomy, Rawls is 
characteristically at pains to emphasize that it is to be understood as a political value, 
not an ethical one; stating it is realized “in public life by affirming the political 
principles of justice and enjoying the protections of basic rights and liberties” and also 
“by participating in society’s public affairs and sharing in its collective self-
determination over time”.49
46 When the stability condition is satisfied by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines some citizens see the political conception of justice as merely “not in conflict with” their other 
values (Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 140). But even for these citizens, the shaping influence that 
the political conception has had on them is not an alien imposition, for, ex hypothesi, they do not see 
themselves as having sufficient reason to reject their sense of justice.  
47 Indeed, when Rawls begins to lay out the stability argument in Theory one of his central concerns is 
with the possibility that citizens will come to reject their sense of justice because of their realization that 
it is “largely shaped and accounted for by the contingencies of early childhood” (451) and he writes in 
response that a stable well-ordered society is one in which “no one’s moral convictions are the result of 
coercive indoctrination” (452). 
48 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 77.  
49 Ibid. 77–78. 
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What conditions must be satisfied for a citizen to be autonomous in this way? Rawls’s 
discussion suggests the following set of conditions, which draw on various features 
of his view.50 The first condition should already be clear: to be autonomous, citizens 
must accept the principles of political morality that order their society and have thus 
played a role in shaping them into who they are. The second condition is that the 
principles that citizens accept and act on must be fully public. This means that the full 
justification for the principles of justice must be publicly available to citizens—the 
principles cannot be an esoteric morality as in the examples of Plato and Sidgwick 
above. The third condition is that the principles of justice that citizens accept and act 
on must have the right content: for citizens to be autonomous these principles must 
make it possible for them to enjoy the protection of rights and liberties. As we saw 
earlier, this is achieved in Rawls’s theory by the requirement that liberal conceptions 
of justice both prioritize a set of rights and liberties and ensure all citizens have 
adequate all-purpose means to make use of those rights and liberties. The third 
condition appeals to Rawls’s idea of public reason. For citizens to be autonomous, when 
public officials make decisions and advocate for policies that bear on constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice, they must do so based on public reasons. 
Similarly, when citizens debate or vote on such measures in the public political forum 
they must be “prepared to show in due course that [they] can be supported by [public] 
reasons”.51 The fourth and final condition is that for citizens to be autonomous the 
principles of justice that they accept and act on must “specify the fair terms of 
cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal 
persons”.52 This condition stipulates that citizens must accept and act on principles 
that would be chosen in the original position, as that is a choice situation in which 
they are fairly represented as free equals. Another way to put this is to say that for 
50 Here I follow the reconstruction of these conditions in Weithman, “Autonomy and Disagreement 
about Justice in Political Liberalism,” supra note 8 at 102–105. 
51 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 444–445. 
52 Ibid., 77. This is what Weithman calls the ‘collective self-legislation condition’ (“Autonomy and 
Disagreement about Justice in Political Liberalism,” supra note 8 at 102).  
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citizens to be autonomous the principles that they accept and act on must have the 
right source: they must be principles they would give themselves in the original 
position.  
Together this set of conditions ensures that when the citizens of the well-ordered 
society accept the principles of justice that have shaped them into who they are, they 
do so not out of ignorance or duress. They enjoy the full protection of a set of rights 
and liberties, and the full justification for the political decisions that constrain their 
actions is available to them. Their decision to accept and act on these principles can 
therefore aptly be described as autonomous.  
Confronted with this conception of autonomy, some may respond by asking why all 
these conditions must be satisfied for citizens to live fully autonomously. Suppose a 
citizen enjoys the secure protection of rights and liberties and makes choices about 
how to live her life from an adequate range of options, while free from the influence 
of coercion and manipulation.53 Even if this person rejects the principles of justice that 
regulate her society, could she not nonetheless be described as fully autonomous? This 
is an important question, but by drawing on the preceding discussion I believe it can 
be given a powerful response. To see this, consider the follow passage from Political 
Liberalism: 
The government’s authority [cannot] be freely accepted in the sense that the 
bonds of society and culture, of history and social place of origin, begin so early 
to shape our life and are normally so strong that the right of emigration 
(suitably qualified) does not suffice to make accepting its authority free, 
politically speaking, in the way that liberty of conscience suffices to make 
accepting ecclesiastical authority free, politically speaking. Nevertheless, we 
may over the course of life come freely to accept, as the outcome of reflective 
thought and reasoned judgment, the ideals, principles, and standards that 
53 These conditions are central to Raz’s conception of personal autonomy in The Morality of Freedom, 
supra note 44 at 369–399. 
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specify our basic rights and liberties, and effectively guide and moderate the 
political power to which we are subject. This is the outer limit of our freedom.54
When it comes to accepting the authority of an association like the church, the secure 
protection of rights and liberties, freedom from coercion and manipulation, and an 
adequate range of options from which to choose may suffice to render this acceptance 
free. But when it comes to accepting political authority—which, as we have seen, 
exerts a significant shaping influence on us from early in our lives—these weaker 
conditions do not suffice to render our acceptance fully free. Those who reject the 
ideals and principles that are used to argue for and specify political decisions in their 
society are rejecting a central influence that has acted on them to shape them into who 
they are. They are not, therefore, at the outer limit of their freedom until they can come 
to give these ideals and principles their reflective endorsement. It is for this reason 
that the complete set of conditions set out above is necessary for citizens to be fully 
autonomous. 
With the conditions of full autonomy before us, we are now able to set out the defense 
of the stability condition that appeals to this idea. To fix ideas, we can begin from the 
argument for political liberalism that I set out earlier: that we ought to endorse 
political liberal principles because of their ability to satisfy the stability condition, 
given the fact of reasonable pluralism. The challenge for this line of reasoning that we 
are hoping to address is stability-skepticism. Why must we accept principles that 
could satisfy the stability condition? Is it not, after all, a live possibility that the correct 
principles of political morality are simply not capable of securing this kind of 
consensus?  
The argument from full autonomy supplements the original line of reasoning with 
two further premises. The first is that principles that satisfy the stability condition are 
54 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 222. Emphasis added.
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necessary for citizens of the well-ordered society to enjoy full autonomy. The second 
is that we ought to accept the principles that allow citizens of the well-ordered society 
to enjoy full autonomy. The argument runs as follows: 
(1) Only a political liberalism can satisfy the stability condition, given the fact 
of reasonable pluralism. 
(2) Principles that satisfy the stability condition are necessary for the citizens 
of the well-ordered society to enjoy full autonomy.  
(3) We ought to accept the principles that allow the citizens of the well-
ordered society to enjoy full autonomy.  
(4) Therefore, we ought to accept a political liberalism.55
Before evaluating the premises of this argument, let me first consider a more general 
worry that some may have about it. Some may suspect that, due to political 
liberalism’s concern with reasonable pluralism, any autonomy-based defense of the 
view will be a non-starter. They might think, that is, that when Rawls acknowledged 
that any society well-ordered by liberal principles would be marked by adherence to 
a plurality of reasonable comprehensive doctrines, he thereby acknowledged that 
there is no conception of autonomy that all reasonable citizens could be expected to 
accept. As Jonathan Quong puts the point, when considering the possibility of 
autonomy-based defense of political liberalism: since “it would not be unreasonable 
55 Clayton sets out an argument from autonomy to political liberalism of essentially this form in Justice 
and Legitimacy in Upbringing, supra note 8 at 11–19. My argument in what follows will go beyond his 
analysis by addressing an important challenge to premise (3) that he does not consider. 
Though Weithman has given a central place to autonomy in his writings on political liberalism, 
he does not endorse this argument. In the paper where he writes that “Rawls’s principles of legitimacy 
and public reason are grounded on his commitment to political autonomy” he does not appeal to 
autonomy to address stability-skepticism. Rather, when it comes to defending the stability condition, 
he argues that terms of social cooperation must play a social role—they must “provide an enduring 
public basis for justifying the distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation”. And he 
suggests “they can play that role only if they are freely accepted over time by those who live under 
them.” (“In Defense of a Political Liberalism,” supra note 8 at 398, 410–411). This is a quite a different 
route to addressing stability-skepticism, and one that I think is not fully satisfactory. The deepest and 
most challenging form of that skepticism comes, I believe, from those like Sidgwick who would deny 
that principles must play this social role.  
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for some citizens to reject this account of autonomy […] this account of public reason’s 
basis would be unstable in a well-ordered society”.56 The thought here is that since all 
conceptions of autonomy are subject to reasonable disagreement, none can be the basis 
of political liberalism. 
This objection depends on the claim that the pluralism that a society well-ordered 
according to political liberal principles would be marked by rules out the possibility 
of its citizens having a shared commitment to full autonomy. Even among proponents 
of political liberalism, however, the question of precisely what could be shared by the 
citizens of a well-ordered society is contested.57 Those who doubt that a commitment 
to full autonomy could be shared are likely motivated by the same general thought 
that motivated Rawls to develop a political liberalism: that the exercise of human 
reason under liberal institutions will tend to lead to pluralism. However, if they are 
not proponents of what I called content-skepticism above, then they must hold that—
despite this tendency toward pluralism—political liberal principles can nonetheless 
satisfy the stability condition. In accepting that political liberal principles can satisfy 
the stability condition, they are accepting that the socializing influences of growing 
up in a well-ordered society suffice to induce citizens to share a commitment to a set 
of substantive values and principles, provided these values and principles are limited 
in their range of application to the political domain. Given that full autonomy is also 
56 “On the Idea of Public Reason,” in The Blackwell Companion to Rawls, edited by Jon Mandle and David 
A. Reidy, (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013):  271. 
57 Rawls’s view was that the well-ordered society would be marked by agreement on the view that 
political constructivism is an appropriate basis for making objective judgments about political morality 
(Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 110)—a consensus which seems no less demanding than a consensus 
on the political value of full autonomy. Others, such as Leif Wenar, have argued that the shared 
commitments of the citizens of the well-ordered society would be much more minimal, “Political 
Liberalism: An Internal Critique,” Ethics 106 (1995): 32–62. See also Quong, who seems to hold that that 
no more than a commitment to the ideal of society as a fair system of cooperation among free equals 
could be shared by all reasonable citizens (Liberalism without Perfection, supra note 10 at 37–39). I have 
argued elsewhere that the scope of reasonable disagreement depends on our reasons for accepting a 
political liberal or public reason view in the first place, see Paul Billingham and Anthony Taylor, “A 
Framework for Analyzing Public Reason Theories,” European Journal of Political Theory, Forthcoming. 
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a value that is limited in its range of application to the political domain, the general 
thought that the exercise of human reason under liberal institutions tends to engender 
pluralism will not suffice to support the claim that it could not be among the shared 
commitments of citizens, at least for those who are not proponents of content-
skepticism. The objector must therefore base their support for this claim on something 
other than this general thought about liberalism and pluralism.58
To address content-skepticism, any defender of political liberalism will at some point 
have to address the question of what can be shared by citizens of the well-ordered 
society. At this point they will need to show that the case they make for the stability 
condition is one that those citizens could be expected to accept. Importantly, though, 
this is true regardless of the case that is made for the stability condition: there is no 
reason to single out the argument from full autonomy as especially vulnerable to this 
potential problem. Given that there is no reason to single out full autonomy on this 
score, the concern that the argument is a nonstarter is misplaced. We should, at this 
stage, treat the question of whether citizens of the well-ordered society could share a 
commitment to full autonomy as open.59
Let us now turn to the premises of the argument. The first premise is questioned by 
what I called content-skepticism above, which asks why we should accept that the 
possibilities for consensus in the well-ordered society fall where Rawls and his 
defenders take them to. Since I am setting that particular skeptical challenge aside 
here, I will assume that this premise holds. Premise (2) holds because, given the 
conception of autonomy specified above, satisfaction of the stability condition is 
58 On this see also Anthony Taylor, “Rawls’s Conception of Autonomy,” The Routledge Handbook of 
Autonomy, edited by Ben Colburn, Forthcoming.  
59 For a reading of Political Liberalism that seems to hold that the political value of full autonomy could 
be shared by the citizens of the well-ordered society, see Rainer Forst, “Political Liberalism: A Kantian 
View,” Ethics 128 (2017): 123–144, at 140.  
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necessary for citizens of the well-ordered society to enjoy it. The focus of my critical 
attention here will therefore be on premise (3).  
Though I have argued that full autonomy is a plausible conception of autonomy, this 
is not sufficient to support premise (3) of the argument, as it does not get to the heart 
of the challenge that stability-skepticism poses. If we think that the fundamental aim 
of political philosophy is to identify the conditions under which we can live freely—
to uncover, as Rawls puts it, “the outer limit of our freedom”—then perhaps we will 
think that enough has been said to support premise (3). But that would be to attribute 
a controversial aim to our theorizing. Proponents of stability-skepticism need not 
accept that the point of political philosophy is to identify the conditions under which 
citizens can live freely. Instead, they may hold that their aim is to identify the 
principles of political morality that we have most reason to accept. If the aim of 
identifying the conditions under which citizens can live autonomously comes into 
conflict with the aim of identifying the principles that we have most reason to accept, 
then the latter aim ought to be given priority. Indeed, no sensible advocate of the aim 
of identifying autonomy-realizing principles would deny this: they would hold that 
the principles that identify the conditions under which citizens can live autonomously 
are the principles we have most reason to accept. If they did not endorse this claim, it 
would be unclear why we should accept their principles. 
Another way to put this thought is to say that proponents of the view that the point 
of political philosophy is to identify the conditions under which citizens can live 
autonomously must accept  
Harmony: The principles that allow citizens of the well-ordered society to 
enjoy full autonomy are the principles that we have most reason to accept. 
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If Harmony were sound, we would have a powerful defense of premise (3): we ought 
to accept the principles that allow citizens of the well-ordered society to live 
autonomously, because these are the principles that we have most reason to accept. 
However, we cannot assume in advance that Harmony is true. On any plausible 
interpretation of their views, those who reject the aim of identifying the principles that 
allow citizens to live autonomously do so because they reject Harmony. If we were 
simply to assume that these two aims are not in conflict, we would be ruling out such 
views by fiat. The argument from full autonomy therefore needs a defense of 
Harmony in order to succeed. 
IV. 
We now have the argument from full autonomy to political liberalism before us. It has 
the potential to play a foundational role in justifying political liberalism by allowing 
us to reject stability-skepticism. However, as I have argued, in order for the argument 
to play this role a defense of Harmony is needed. In this penultimate section of the 
paper, I will put forward a provisional defense of Harmony.  
To begin this defense, let us return to the point of view of a citizen of the well-ordered 
society. She is reflecting on whether to affirm her desire to act justly or to take steps to 
rid herself of it. When the stability condition is satisfied, she concludes that she has 
sufficient reason to affirm it. From her point of view, then, the principles that allow 
her to live autonomously and the principles that she has most reason to accept are 
identical. The principles she accepts and has grown up under allow her to live 
autonomously, as the role they have played in shaping her desires and self-conception 
is one that she endorses. And these principles are also the principles that she has the 
most reason to accept, as she can see no reason to reject them in favor an alternative. 
However, this fact does not suffice as a defense of Harmony. For what matters to the 
opponent of that claim is what principles we—actual citizens, here and now—have 
most reason to accept, not what principles the citizens of a well-ordered society have 
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most reason to accept. Given that our circumstances are quite different from the 
circumstances of citizens of any well-ordered society, it is not obvious that the 
principles they have most reason to accept are the principles we have most reason to 
accept. 
In order to defend Harmony, then, we need to show that the principles that the 
citizens of the well-ordered society have most reason to accept are also the principles 
that we have most reason to accept. I will do this by defending the following two 
claims. 
(H1) The principles that we have most reason to accept are those that we would 
accept if we were fully informed, procedurally rational, and not influenced by 
any other factors that distort our judgment.  
(H2) The citizens of a society well-ordered according to political liberal 
principles are fully informed, procedurally rational, and not influenced by 
any other factors that distort their judgment.  
(H1) follows from a widely accepted view about how we ought to work out what 
principles to accept in moral and political philosophy. According to the method of 
reflective equilibrium, we should work back and forth between our considered moral 
judgments and the principles we think best explain them, making modifications at 
both levels with the aim of reaching the point at which our principles both cohere with 
and explain our considered convictions. Accepting this method implies accepting 
(H1), as what we should be doing when we work back and forth between our 
considered convictions and the principles that might explain them is: availing 
ourselves of information that might influence our decision; following uncontroversial 
norms of procedural rationality; and ensuring that our choice of principles is not 
influenced by any other factors that might distort our judgment. To see how 
uncontroversial this is, we need only consider what rejecting it would entail: that we 
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ought to choose what principles to accept by avoiding relevant information, violating 
norms of procedural rationality, or trying to be swayed by distorting factors.60
(H2), on the other hand, is considerably more controversial and will therefore be the 
focus of our discussion. What is controversial about (H2) is not the claim that citizens 
of the well-ordered society are fully informed and procedurally rational. These 
idealizing conditions are contained within the definition of a well-ordered society. 
That the citizens of the well-ordered society are procedurally rational follows from 
how they reason about whether to give the principles of justice their reflective 
endorsement: they consider what would best satisfy all of the other desires that they 
have. And that the citizens of the well-ordered society are fully informed follows from 
the fact that their society satisfies a publicity condition: its citizens all know the 
entirety of the case for the principles of justice that order their society, including the 
beliefs and modes of reasoning that support them. That is, they are fully informed 
about the considerations that are relevant to their choice of what principles to accept.  
What is controversial about (H2) is the claim that citizens of the well-ordered society 
are not, in their decision to endorse or reject the principles of justice that order their 
society, influenced by any distorting factors beyond the absence of information or 
failures of procedural rationality. As we saw above, to satisfy the stability condition, 
principles must be able to secure citizens’ endorsement when only certain influences 
on their desires are permitted: the public educative effects of growing up in a society 
well-ordered according to liberal principles. This is what I called the Freedom 
Condition above, as its role is to ensure that citizens’ reflective endorsement of the 
60 Some may want to object to (H1) on the grounds that it amounts to the controversial thesis that the 
relationship between the principles that we have most reason to accept and our responses in these ideal 
conditions is constitutive. But (H1) does not imply this controversial claim, nor is such a claim needed 
to defend Harmony. We can accept (H1) on solely the grounds that the best way to work out what 
principles we have most reason to accept is to think about what we would accept in these ideal 
conditions, while rejecting the claim that our responses in these ideal conditions are constitutive of such 
principles.  
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principles of justice is given freely. Whether or not we should accept (H2) depends on 
whether we think that the Freedom Condition accurately eliminates the set of factors 
that might distort our judgment about what principles to accept, beyond the absence 
of relevant information and failures of procedural rationality. That is, it depends on 
whether we think that when deciding what principles of political morality to accept 
we should imagine that we have grown up in a society well-ordered according to 
political liberal principles, and then consider what we would accept in such 
circumstances. Of course, it is not at all obvious that we should do this. Why should 
the principles we have most reason to accept be those that we would accept if our lives 
had been so radically different?  
We can put the challenge posed by this question more precisely by noting that there 
are two ways the Freedom Condition, and thus (H2), could be dismissed. First, it 
might be argued that the condition is too strong: that it rules out influences on citizens’ 
choices that should in fact be permitted. Second, it might be argued that it is too weak: 
that it permits influences on citizens’ choices that in fact distort their decision of what 
principles to accept. I will now consider each of these challenges in turn.  
A. Too Strong? 
Let us begin with the too strong variant of the objection. The Freedom Condition holds 
that citizens must endorse the principles of justice in the absence of coercion and the 
threat of punishment. What this claim means is that the decision to accept or reject the 
principles of justice occurs when citizens are protected by various liberal rights, such 
as to freedom of conscience, expression, and association. A proponent of the objection 
that the freedom condition is too strong must therefore hold that for this choice to be 
made free from the influence of distorting factors, some violations of these rights must 
be permitted.  
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It is hard to see what would motivate this position. These liberal rights give citizens 
the freedom to form, examine, and revise their commitments. In this way, they are 
beneficial, and often necessary, for the proper exercise of our capacity for reasoned 
choice. This is a strong reason for holding that the choice of whether to endorse or 
reject the principles should occur when the citizens are protected by these rights.  
B. Too Weak?
The too weak variant of the objection is much more plausible. Since the influences on 
citizens that are permitted by the Freedom Condition are the public educative effects 
of growing up in a society well-ordered by political liberal principles, proponents of 
too weak objection must hold that these influences distort their judgment. The most 
natural reason to think this is if we suspect that such influences are manipulative or 
indoctrinating.  
To evaluate this objection, we first need to be clear about what exactly public 
educative effects amount to. Growing up in a society in which particular principles 
are unanimously followed and publicly acknowledged as the appropriate standard 
for settling competing claims will undoubtedly have a significant influence on a 
citizen’s beliefs, desires, and self-conception. The Freedom Condition holds this 
process of socialization is not manipulative or indoctrinating on the condition that we 
would later come to endorse it in conditions of freedom.  
Are these socializing effects nonetheless indoctrinating? Before answering this 
question, let me first note two initial points. First, it is inevitable that citizens are 
shaped by their upbringing and the conditions under which this takes place. There is 
no possible upbringing that is entirely free of shaping influences. This means that if 
the proponent of this objection wants to avoid asserting the skeptical view that 
everyone’s judgement is always distorted as a result of having had an upbringing of 
some kind, then they will have to accept that some shaping influences are consistent 
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with us not having been indoctrinated. This does not mean, however, that any shaping 
influences whatsoever are acceptable. This leads to the second point: shaping 
influences would be unacceptable if they diminished or destroyed our capacity to 
reason. Therefore, if we thought that the effects of growing up under political liberal 
principles diminished or destroyed our capacity to reason, we would have grounds to 
hold that the Freedom Condition is too weak. But there is no basis for this concern. 
Political liberalism’s rationale for giving priority to a set of liberal rights and ensuring 
all citizens have adequate all-purpose means to make use of those liberties is precisely 
that such conditions are beneficial for the development and exercise of citizens’ 
capacity to reason. These principles nurture and protect that capacity rather than 
diminishing or destroying it.  
With these two points in mind, the question of whether the public educative effects of 
growing up under political liberal principles amounts to manipulation or 
indoctrination can be answered as follows. Given that citizens are inevitably 
influenced by shaping influences of one kind or another, the highest standard we 
could expect these influences to meet is one whereby they would come freely endorse 
those influences “as the outcome of reflective thought and reasoned judgment”.61 If 
political liberal principles satisfy the stability condition, then the shaping influences 
that they have on the citizens of the well-ordered society are the ones that meet this 
high standard. There are therefore no good grounds to hold that they amount to 
manipulation or indoctrination.  
I think, then, that we can also dismiss the claim that the Freedom Condition, and thus 
(H2), is too weak. Let us now return to Harmony. I have argued that the Freedom 
Condition is neither too weak nor too strong to capture the conditions under which 
our powers of judgment operate free from distorting influences. Since the citizens of 
61 Political Liberalism, supra note 4 at 222.   
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the well-ordered society are also procedurally rational and fully informed in the 
relevant sense, this implies we should accept 
(H2) The citizens of a society well-ordered according to political liberal 
principles are fully informed, procedurally rational, and not influenced by 
any other distorting factors.  
I have also argued that we should accept  
(H1) The principles that we have most reason to accept are those that we would 
accept if we were fully informed, procedurally rational, and not influenced by 
any other factors that distort our judgment.  
Together, I have argued that (H1) and (H2) allow us to defend  
Harmony: The principles that allow citizens of the well-ordered society to 
enjoy full autonomy are the principles that we have most reason to accept. 
The principles that allow the citizens of the well-ordered society to enjoy full 
autonomy are those that would satisfy the stability condition: those that they would 
give their free and reflective endorsement to. If this case for Harmony is sound, these 
are also the principles that we have most reason to accept. When we are thinking about 
what principles of political morality to accept we should imagine that we have grown 
up in a society well-ordered according to political liberal principles, and then consider 
what we would accept in such circumstances, for these are circumstances in which we 
are fully informed, procedurally rational, and not influenced by any other factors that 
might distort our judgment.  
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V.  
By appealing to the case I have made for Harmony, we can defend premise (3) of the 
argument from full autonomy to political liberalism: the claim that we ought to accept 
the principles that allow citizens of the well-ordered society to enjoy full autonomy. 
Since only principles that satisfy the stability condition allow citizens of the well-
ordered society to enjoy full autonomy, this implies that we ought to accept the 
principles that satisfy the stability condition. I therefore conclude that the argument 
from full autonomy, in conjunction with Harmony, can provide a defense of the 
stability condition.  
An important limit to this argument is that it assumes that content-skepticism can be 
answered: that political liberal principles satisfy the stability condition. I have 
assumed, but not argued for this claim. If it is false, then we must reject premise (1) of 
the argument from full autonomy. A full defense of political liberalism that appeals to 
autonomy and Harmony would therefore need to show that political liberal principles 
are in fact the ones that the citizens of the well-ordered society would give their free 
and reflective endorsement to. However, the defense of the stability condition offered 
here is nonetheless quite significant. For it gives us a provisional case for holding that 
the principles that satisfy the condition are the principles we have most reason to 
accept.  
